THE MORAL DECISION ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY by Iris Murdock

Reprinted by permission from MAN AND SOCIETY London, England

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When homosexuality is discussed these days it is often said that "we ought to know the facts." In these discussions it is sometimes assumed that homosexuality is a social problem or disease for the removal of which we need the help of psychiatrists, sociologists and other experts. I wish to argue that the problem of homosexuality is fundamentally moral problem which the whole community ought to face, and that the facts we need in order to make a judgment about it are quite ordinary facts which are accessible to the observation of ordinary people. However, since the various arguments in the dispute have become (especially of late) so involved, it is first necessary to sort out a number of separate issues.

The discussion about whether the English law ought to be changed is not the one with which I am here concerned. Of course the law ought to be changed, and support of this reform is clearly compatible with very various views about the desirability of homosexual practices. Nor do I propose here to argue with those who object to homosexuality only on the ground that there should be no sexual relations outside marriage. Someone who, on this ground -perhaps for religious reasons-condemned all irregular unions, would seem to me to be making a perfectly arguable moral judgment which one

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must respect, whether or not one agrees with it. There are also people who interpret their religion as simply and

without argument forbidding homosexuality, and with these I will not, indeed cannot, dispute either.

Comprehensible too, though less worthy, are the cautious citizens who argue that one ought never to be a party to persuading or allowing another person to do something of which society disapproves. However, those who find homosexuality objectionable often adopt a rather more complicated position, relying on arguments from what they take to be the 'special nature' of a homosexual as opposed to a heterosexual relationship, and these are the arguments I want to discuss.

Naturally there are all sorts of general moral considerations which apply to unions of either kind, and about which there is a large measure of agreement. One ought not to seduce minors. One ought to aim at a steady relationship. One ought to be truthful and loyal to one's partner. One ought not to be promiscuous. How exactly we conduct our sex life is an important moral problem for all of us, whether we are heterosexual or homosexual. These general considerations would only enter into our moral judgment about homosexuality if it could be shown that homosexuals were, and heterosexuals were not, inclined to practices of which on

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